We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make risky, negative net-present-value loans; and 2) managerial rent-seeking, the result of bank owners investing in inefficient "pet" projects or shirking in effort. The privately optimal level of bank leverage is neither too low nor too high: It efficiently balances the market discipline that owners of risky debt impose on managerial rentseeking against the asset substitution induced at high levels of leverage. However, when correlated bank failures can impose significant social costs, regulators may bail out bank creditors. Anticipation of this action generates an equilibrium featuring systemic risk, in which all banks choose inefficiently high leverage to fund correlated, excessively risky assets. Leverage can be reduced via a minimum equity capital requirement, which can also rule out asset substitution. But this also compromises market discipline by making bank debt too safe. Optimal capital regulation requires that a part of bank capital be unavailable to creditors upon failure so as to retain market discipline and be made available to shareholders only contingent on good performance in order to contain risk-taking.
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CAUGHT BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS? REGULATING BANK LEVERAGE WHEN THERE IS RENT-SEEKING AND RISK-SHIFTING
"In many things, the middle have the best / Be mine a middle station." -Phocylides
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the prudential regulation of banks has emerged once again as an issue of critical importance. The central question being asked is this: What is the socially optimal amount of capital that banks should be required to hold on their balance sheets?
Underlying this question is recognition that the private cost of bank equity capital may exceed its social cost-meaning that the amount of capital a bank will typically choose as its private optimum may diverge from the social optimum. This possibility creates the raison d'être for capital regulation. The exact form that such capital regulation should take is, however, still under debate.
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In this paper, we address this central question with a theoretical approach that recognizes the well-known frictions in banking and seeks to generate an implementable policy prescription for regulating bank capital. Broadly, our proposal is aimed at increasing bank capital in a way that does not compromise bank discipline by uninsured creditors, yet keeps in check bank incentives to take excessive leverage and risks that are correlated with those of other banks.
We begin with the observation that banks face two kinds of moral hazard problems: (i) managerial rent-seeking, which can take the form of managers pursing private benefits via investments in "pet projects" ("tunneling" in extreme cases) or shirking in effort; and (ii) asset substitution or risk-1 Numerous ideas have been put forth recently for how capital regulation-which has traditionally focused on tier-1 capital (common equity and some hybrid claims combining debt and equity features)-ought to be redone. It has been proposed, for example, to use "contingent capital" (Flannery (2005) ), which infuses capital into banks via conversion of debt into equity when banks get close to insolvency, individually and/or collectively. An alternative, stressed by Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2010) , is to simply increase levels of bank capital in good times. Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010a) have proposed tying capital requirements -or alternatively taxes (2010b) -to contributions of individual financial firms to capital shortages of the financial sector as a whole.
shifting, which is the shareholder-creditor conflict that bank equity value may be enhanced by engaging in excessively risky, negative net-present-value projects at the expense of creditors.
The first moral hazard problem-that of managerial rent-seeking -is well-recognized, and it has been proposed that (uninsured) debt can provide the necessary market discipline to ameliorate this moral hazard (Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) ).
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The second moral hazard problem-that of risk shifting-is also well recognized and is considered to be dealt with most effectively by ensuring that the bank has sufficient equity capital (see, e.g., Merton (1977) ). 3 A study of bank failures by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (1988) confirmed that these two moral hazard problems seem simultaneously relevant in understanding bank failures. 4 The emerging evidence from the financial crisis of 2007-09 appears to lead to a similar conclusion.
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We would ordinarily expect the privately optimal capital structure choices of banks to deal efficiently with these two forms of moral hazard. However, since there is an inherent conflict between how the two moral hazard problems can be addressed-risk-shifting by raising capital and rent-seeking by raising leverage-it is not clear what the private optimum would look like, particularly relative to bank capital structures observed in practice, since the observed capital structures are also affected by the everpresent possibility of government bailouts when poor lending practices create systemic failures.
2 Specifics of modeling differ across models. For instance, Diamond and Rajan (2001) model the managerial rentseeking as a hold-up problem in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1994) .
3 While Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed this as a problem for non-financial corporations, it is exacerbated in the case of financial firms by implicit and explicit guarantees such as deposit insurance (Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) ) and the ease with which financial risks can be altered (Myers and Rajan (1998) ). 4 The OCC's study was based on an analysis of banks that failed, that became problems and recovered, or that remained healthy during the period 1979-87. The study analyzed 171 failed banks to identify characteristics and conditions present when bank health deteriorated. The study concludes: "Management-driven weaknesses played a significant role in the decline of 90 percent of the failed and problem banks the OCC evaluated. Many of the difficulties the banks experienced resulted from inadequate loan policies, problem loan identification systems, and systems to ensure compliance with internal policies and banking law. In other cases, directors' or managements' overly aggressive behavior also resulted in imprudent lending practices and excessive loan growth that forced the banks to rely on volatile liabilities and to maintain inadequate liquid assets." 5 For instance, on April 12, 2010, Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, issued a statement prior to beginning a series of hearings on the financial crisis. In the statement, he addressed some of the lending practices of Washington Mutual, the largest thrift in the United States until it was seized by the government and sold to J.P. Morgan Chase in 2008 (see U.S. Senate Press Release, "Senate Subcommittee Launches Series of Hearings on Wall Street and the Financial Crisis," April 12, 2010). The statement confirms evidence of poor lending, but also fraudulent documentation and lack of disclosure.
Motivated by these observations, we attempt to answer the following questions. First, how do the disciplining roles of bank capital and leverage interact? Second, what does this interaction imply about the bank's privately optimal capital structure? Third, how does regulatory intervention in the form of ex post bank bailouts affect the bank's capital structure? Does the possibility of bailouts justify regulatory capital requirements? And if so, what form should these requirements take?
We begin by combining both forms of moral hazard -rent-seeking and risk-shifting -in a single model. We use this model to explicitly characterize the tension between the need to have enough bank leverage for market discipline and the need to have enough bank capital to attenuate asset-substitution incentives. We show that if leverage is too low, debt is essentially safe and creditors lack the incentive to monitor and discipline the rent-seeking behavior of bank managers. However, if leverage is too high, managers are inclined to choose risky assets and bet the bank with the creditors' money.
The privately-optimal capital structure of the bank is like a ship navigating carefully between the mythological sea monsters Scylla (rent-seeking) and Charybdis (asset substitution). Formally, there are conditions under which the bank has a range of incentive-compatible leverage levels, and as long as bank leverage is in this range, both forms of moral hazard are well addressed (Case I). In this case, private contracting between the bank and its financiers leads to an optimal capital structure in which ex-ante bank liquidity is maximized by choosing the highest level of leverage that does not induce asset substitution, but is still sufficiently high to induce discipline by creditors. The result is the choice of the first-best project by the bank. However, there are other conditions (Case II) under which it is impossible to simultaneously choose leverage that is high enough to induce creditor discipline but low enough to deter asset substitution. In this case, the bank's (second best) choice of capital structure must tolerate either the inefficiency of the manager choosing a rent-seeking project or the inefficiency of an excessively risky project, neither of which is first best.
This benchmark model can be viewed as capturing the problem of an individual bank that is one of arbitrarily many banks with uncorrelated project choices. However, asset substitution at banks is often correlated across banks. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) show, for instance, that most financial crises are preceded by a secular credit boom and asset-price inflation (often, but not restricted to, the real estate sector) fueled by the financial sector. We argue that this phenomenon is attributable to the presence of government guarantees and the lender of last resort (LOLR), which are triggered when banks (or financial firms in general) fail together; in this circumstance, it is time-inconsistent for regulators to refuse to bail out banks.
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In the absence of rules precluding forbearance or facilitating orderly low-cost resolution (which may be practically infeasible when there are wholesale failures) the regulator/government has a strong incentive to rescue banks by bailing out bank creditors but allowing bank equity to be wiped out. We take such forbearance as given and show that the anticipation of it generates multiple Nash equilibria in banks' leverage choices. In one equilibrium, systemic risk is inefficiently increased via two channels-banks over-lever and they also take on excessive levels of correlated asset risk. As creditors anticipate being bailed out, increasing bank leverage is not met with a higher cost of debt financing, nor is there any credit rationing. In fact, somewhat perversely, banks' ability to raise leverage is enhanced when they take excessive risk. This is because riskier projects allow creditors to be promised a higher upside, but their downside risk is "socialized". This situation enables banks to "loot" the taxpayer, in the sense of Akerlof and Romer (1993) , by paying out dividends and eroding bank capital even as bank risk and leverage rise.
Such looting arises purely through shareholder value maximization by banks. Indeed, because shareholders do not get bailed out ex post, excessively risky projects cannot be funded through equity, but they can be funded through debt that is de facto government-backed due to an implicit bailout assurance.
Since debt is fairly priced, it becomes the conduit through which shareholders transfer risks onto
In particular, when bank failures are correlated, there can be sufficiently high social costs associated with a systemic collapse of financial intermediation and markets, as witnessed in 2008
following the failures of Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, American
International Group, and some of their global counterparts.
6 Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) , Acharya (2009), and Farhi and Tirole (2009) build formal models of the regulator's time-consistency problem when banks fail together and of the induced herding behavior in banks. The point that excessive systemic risk may ultimately be rooted in government safety nets and time inconsistency of regulation was recognized as early as Kindleberger (1978) and has been reinforced recently by Kane (2010) , among others.
taxpayers. To the best of our knowledge, this perverse effect of government guarantees in expanding the debt capacity of projects more as risk increases has not been recognized explicitly before.
A regulatory capital requirement can potentially address the systemic risk in this inefficient equilibrium. Under conditions guaranteeing that the privately-optimal capital structure in the absence of regulatory forbearance can fully resolve different forms of moral hazard (Case I), a simple minimum equity capital requirement does the job of restoring the first-best project choice and eliminating correlated risk taking and excessive leverage. But under conditions that make it impossible for private contracting to simultaneously resolve different moral hazards (Case II), a minimum equity capital requirement is not efficient: The amount of equity capital that renders asset substitution unattractive makes debt so safe that it provides little market discipline, and bank efficiency is sacrificed as a result. Instead, the optimal capital requirement features a two-tiered structure that has the following features.
First, the bank should be required to keep a minimum amount of equity capital, which may be viewed as being similar to a leverage-ratio restriction or a tier-1 capital requirement. This capital faces no restrictions regarding assets in which it is invested.
Second, the bank must also be required to keep an additional "special capital account." This capital is special in the sense that it is subject to contingent distribution rights. It belongs to the bank's shareholders when the bank is solvent, like any other form of capital. But in the event of an idiosyncratic failure of a bank, this capital is unavailable to cover the claims of (uninsured) creditors. It belongs instead to the regulator, who can employ it, for instance, to reduce its operational costs or make transfers either to solvent institutions or directly to taxpayers. The purpose of making the special capital account unavailable to creditors is to ensure that even when the bank has sufficiently high capital for shareholders not to substitute assets, creditors view the bank as having sufficiently low capital. Hence, there is sufficiently high "skin in the game" for creditors so that their monitoring incentives are not diluted and the managerial rent-seeking problem is dealt with adequately.
We discuss several details relating to the implementation of such an account by employing dividend restrictions and earning retentions in order to reduce the costs of raising external equity. 7 We note that the specific capital regulation proposal based on our theory is close to a new model for capital regulation proposed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner in his first public speech since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010:
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the related literature. Section II develops the single-bank model with managerial rent-seeking and risk-shifting problems. Section III contains the analysis of privately-optimal bank leverage in this benchmark model. Section IV examines the important extension when bank leverage is affected by correlated defaults and induced regulatory forbearance. Section V discusses the optimal capital requirement featuring the special capital account and its implications for current regulatory proposals. Section VI discusses several model extensions and "Under the framework now being built, firms will be subject to two tiers of capital requirements. All firms will need to hold a substantial minimum level of capital.
And they will be required to hold an added buffer of capital set above the minimum. If a firm suffers losses that force it to eat into that buffer, it will have to raise capital, reduce dividends, or suspend share repurchases. The hope is that this will help make the system more stable over time, in part by forcing banks to move more quickly to strengthen their balance sheets as the risk of potential losses increases."
Our two-tiered capital scheme differs from this proposal, however, by virtue of its contingent distribution rights-notably, that a part of the capital in our scheme is not available for creditor payments (in the event of non-systemic bank failures).
7 In particular, if there is a governance problem between shareholders and managers that is not adequately addressed through private forces, then free cash flow diversion or perquisite consumption (Jensen (1986) ) can also erode bank capital. To address this, we show that, though the first tier of capital can be used to fund any assets permissible for the bank, the special capital must be invested by the bank in pre-designated securities such as risk-free government bonds. This investment restriction makes the special capital account look like a cash-asset reserve requirement, but it goes beyond that because (as explained above) it stipulates a particular form of ownership or contingent distribution rights. robustness issues. Section VII concludes. All proofs not in the main body of the paper are in the Appendix. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) consider optimal regulation of bank capital structure in a model where too much debt can lead to excessive creditor intervention, whereas too much equity can lead to managerial shirking.
I. RELATED LITERATURE
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Acharya and Thakor (2010) highlight that, while bank liquidity is enhanced by short-term debt, such debt can endanger financial stability by increasing the likelihood of contagious asset liquidations by creditors. These liquidations induce ex post regulatory bailouts of banks and ultimately reduce market discipline ex ante. Acharya and Thakor refer to this as the "dark side" of leverage-based liquidity creation, but also highlight that diminishing it through a LOLR or regulatory forbearance runs the risk of eliminating all of the market discipline of debt. While they model the micro-foundations of contagious creditor liquidations, we focus instead on the design of capital regulation that can ameliorate the distortions induced by correlated risk-taking and bailouts.
Our model shares some of their seminal insights, but focuses on the leverage distortions and correlated risk-taking induced by government guarantees and LOLR (see footnote 6).
We also briefly discuss the relationship of our work to the many capital regulation proposals currently on the Stulz (1990) also models rent-seeking moral hazard in a corporate-finance setting in which financing policies are used to reduce the costs of investment distortions. Guembel and White (2007) build a model styled on Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) in which monitoring by different claimholders of the firm is endogenized.
as part of bank regulatory capital. He argues that when a bank's stock price drops and the bank's viability becomes questionable, then its contingent capital (debt to start with) should be converted into equity. Hart and Zingales (2009) and Duffie (2010) focus on forced equity issues by banks when performances is deteriorating. To provide incentives for banks to issue equity and overcome the problem of risk-shifting, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) propose the idea of expanding the limited liability of equity, thereby transferring more risk to bank shareholders than at present, but they question the usefulness of leverage in general as a device to provide discipline of banks.
In another strand of recent proposals, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) discuss the concept of "capital insurance," where a bank can purchase insurance against the risk of system-wide defaults. They argue that this approach would make banks more willing to issue equity and would create a priced mechanism for regulatory capital infusion during a crisis. Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010a) propose taxing the systemic risk of financial institutions. This tax would be based on the expected loss of a financial firm, conditional on the occurrence of a systemic crisis. Acharya et al (2010b) recommend that a bank be required to purchase private capital insurance against its own losses contingent upon market or system-wide crisis.
Our approach has similarities and differences with these proposals. Our proposal of the special capital account expands the shareholders' capital at risk and, on this dimension, is similar to Admati and Pfleiderer's (2009) idea of increasing bank shareholder liability. However, our proposal does not rely purely on increasing equity capital to improve bank-level incentives, as we argue that this can compromise the market discipline role of debt. Our focus is also not on security issues and reliance on capital markets (unlike Flannery (2005) , Zingales (2009), and Duffie (2010) ). In addition, we do not rely on private insurance protection (unlike Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) , and Acharya et al. (2010b) ), which raises counterparty risk issues.
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In the limit, for there to be no counterparty risk, the insurer must hold 100 percent of risk-free government securities against insurance sold. The insurer would pass the costs of holding this liquidity on to the insured, but then the insured might as well keep the liquidity itself (unless it is better to designate liquidity management to an insurance firm to avoid free-cash-flow problems). We prefer that banks (the insured) keep liquidity with a regulator (rather than a private insurance firm) in the form of designated securities such as government bonds.
Rather than investing in insurance, banks can, in practice, build up the capital they need in good times by accumulating retained earnings (and savings) in an account to be used in difficult times when capital is needed. These dynamics could be mechanical so that there is no news or stigma associated with drawing down or building up capital. The key distinguishing feature of our theoretical framework, however, is that banks are compelled to internalize the consequences also of having inadequate capital. Overall, the feature of our proposed capital requirement-that capital be high enough from a shareholder standpoint to deter excessive risk taking, but low enough from a creditor standpoint to induce monitoring and discipline-is novel.
II. MODEL
We present a model that shows how the extent of leverage in a bank's financial structure determines the incentives provided and the discipline imposed by creditors on the bank's project choices. In doing so, the model also explains the economic role played by bank capital.
The Economy
Consider an economy in which all agents are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate of interest is zero. There are three dates: t = 0, 1, and 2. The economy has a large number of banks. At t = 0, each bank is owned by a manager (to start with, same as the bank owners or shareholders, but in a model extension, by shareholders who appoint a manager). For simplicity, we will refer to the managers as "bank owners."
The bank possesses internal liquidity of E in the form of equity at t = 0 as a result of current earnings and We assume that the capital market is competitive so that the expected return that must be provided to investors purchasing the bank's securities is zero. If the bank can raise this financing, bank owners can meet their investment need at t = 0, which then allows them to choose a project at t = 1; no additional financing is required at t = 1. Raising external finance requires the bank to incur a transaction cost 0 T ≥ . For simplicity, we will set 0 T = , but refer to the effect of a positive T when necessary. The time line to be explained below is summarized in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 here
Note this specification limits external bank financing to debt. The bank's equity is all inside equity. We assume this to accommodate the popular view that bank equity is often prohibitively expensive to raise 13 . Thus whenever the bank is called (upon) to put additional equity in its capital structure, the assumption is that this will be achieved over time through earnings retentions.
Project Attributes
There are three mutually-exclusive projects the bank owners can choose from at t = 1: a good project (G), a project (A) that may be preferred by bank owners owing to asset-substitution moral hazard, and a project (B) that maximizes the bank owners' private benefits and thus may also be preferred sometimes. Each project generates a stochastic cash flow at t = 2, denoted as 2 Z . The probability distribution of 2 Z depends on the project choice made by the bank and an interim signal about the state of the world that is publicly observable, denoted as 1 Z . The bank's project choice is made after the realized value of 1 Z is observed.
We describe next the formal structure of the signal and the cash flow of the three projects.
Informally, the good project (G) efficiently balances risk and return, the asset-substitution project (A) is excessively risky, and the private-benefit project (B) lacks efficient innovation and therefore achieves too low a return for the bank.
Signal at t = 1:
13 See Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2010) for a criticism of this "popular" viewpoint. 14 Given our informational environment, debt is a more efficient contract than equity for raising external finance. The policy implications of our analysis do not preclude outside equity, however. So, if restoring appropriate decision-making incentives calls for an equity issue and such an issuance is feasible, then our analysis suggests outside equity should be issued. expected cash flows of projects, whereas the right-hand side captures the difference in probabilities that is bounded from above by 1. We also assume that:
While the first inequality is already implied by (iv) above, the second inequality implies that the expected date-2 payoffs from the good-and asset-substitution projects both exceed the bank's legacy debt to be rolled over, which is the starting investment to be made by the bank.
Note that (ii) and (iii) above imply that projects G and A dominate project B in terms of date-2 expected cash flows and, hence, overall project value at date 0. However, the private-benefit project is still relevant to bank decision-making since the bank owners derive a private benefit of from investing in project B, where
Combined with (i), the restriction in (2) ensures that B is socially inefficient relative to G, regardless of the date-1 signal 1 Z .
First Best
Given the project cash flows above, it is clear that, absent any agency problems, the first-best outcome is for the bank to choose the project G at t = 1. This maximizes the bank's expected cash flows and, as G is a positive net-present-value project, it should be funded by external financing markets absent agency
problems. In what follows, our model development will focus on deriving the second-best solution and characterizing when this solution coincides with the first best.
Bank Owners' Objective
The bank owners' objective is to maximize a weighted average of the equity of the bank and the private benefits derived from project choices. The bank owners maximize
where ( ) E U is the bank owners' date-0 expected utility, and ( ) t E v is the expected value of the date-t residual cash flows available to the bank owners, for t = 0,1,2, where "residual" implies the amount of cash flow left over after any payments are made to external financiers. 1 B is an indicator function for the bank owners choosing project B at date 1 (in which case the derived private benefit is β).
The Contract between the External Financiers and the Bank
Project cash flows are not verifiable by any party other than the initial owners of the bank. Hence, external financiers need certain contractual rights in order to be able to extract repayments from bank owners. We assume that creditors can liquidate the bank's assets if, at t = 2, bank owners do not repay We assume that external financiers (as argued above, they are creditors) possess a monitoring technology that allows them, at a cost 0 c > , to imperfectly discover the bank's project choice at t = 1 and force a change. In particular, incurring the monitoring cost c permits creditors to detect whether the bank has chosen B or some other project, but it does not allow them to distinguish between projects A and G.
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Consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991) ), we will show that the optimal debt contract for raising financing at t = 0 is an "intervention contingent" contract that matures at t = 2 but requires explicit renewal by creditors at t = 1. These creditors could demand repayment in full at t = 1 ("accelerated default") and force liquidation if full repayment is not forthcoming. This situation resembles demandable debt (see also Diamond and Rajan (2001) , and Acharya and Viswanathan (2010)).
For simplicity, we assume that the bank's liquidation value at t = 1 is also L.
That is, even conditional on monitoring-based intervention by creditors at t = 1, project A remains a feasible choice for the bank owners.
15 This may be justified by assuming that creditors would sell the bank upon liquidation to a buyer who would be unable to determine which project was chosen by the bank and who would thus offer a price for the assets that is independent of the project chosen by the bank. 16 Making the liquidation value contingent upon the interim signal does not qualitatively change the analysis. 17 In a model in which the presence of debt creates asset-substitution moral hazard, it must be the case that creditors cannot monitor so effectively as to observe the borrower's project choice perfectly and thereby control it perfectly; otherwise, the shareholder-bondholder conflict is trivialized "by fiat."
The Project Choice at t=1
We will assume that the bank owners prefer the private-benefit project B to the good project G if the interim signal is 1 Z y = , even if the financing for rolling over debt at t = 0 were funded entirely using existing equity (as would be possible if 0 D E = ). That is:
Further, we assume that the bank owners prefer project G to project B if 1 Z x = , even when the entire investment 0 D is externally financed with debt:
In that case, the repayment promised to the creditors, conditional on project G being chosen, is 0 / G D p , so the value of the bank owners' equity with project G is
. Given that promised repayment, the value of bank owners' equity with project B is
, all in the absence of creditor intervention. This makes it clear that bank owners will prefer project G to project B in case of the signal 1
Z being x as long as (5) is satisfied (this is a sufficient condition, as creditor intervention would reduce the attractiveness only of project B).
Summary of Assumptions
We now gather and reiterate the key assumptions of the model:
Assumption 1 (Financing Choices and Number of Banks):
Each bank needs an investment of D 0 that it can meet using inside equity and outside financing (debt) at t = 0. There is an arbitrarily large number of banks in the economy.
Assumption 2 (Project Choices): Each bank's owners can make a project choice at t = 1 from among three mutually exclusive projects, A, G, and B, where G is the efficient (highest expected value) or the good project, A is a "risk shifting" project, and B yields the bank owners private benefits.
Across all banks choosing the same project, the terminal project cash flows are i.i.d. random variables. Project cash flows across banks are independent also for different project choices.
Assumption 3 (Preferences and Pricing):
There is universal risk neutrality as well as competitive pricing in the capital market with a zero riskless interest rate.
Assumption 4 (Bank Owner's Objective):
The bank owners maximize the sum of bank equity value and private benefits. Consumption of private benefits is socially inefficient.
Assumption 5 (Project Preferences):
Bank owners prefer project B to all others when the signal at t = 1 is y and project G to project B when the signal at t = 1 is x. (See (4) and (5)).
Assumption 6 (Creditor Monitoring):
Creditors can incur a cost c > 0, can monitor the bank's project choice at t = 1, and can force a project choice from project B to another project, but they cannot distinguish between projects A and G.
At this stage, there is no regulator in the model and our focus is on optimal private contracting. A rationale for regulatory intervention will be provided in Section IV.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE BENCHMARK MODEL
In this section, we present the analysis of our base model. We solve the model by backward induction, starting with events at t = 1, at which time the bank chooses its project and creditors choose whether to liquidate the bank or allow it to continue. We then move to t = 0, at which time the bank chooses the design of the debt contract for external finance and its capital structure (mix of inside equity and outside debt).
Events at t = 1
At this stage, the main issues of interest are the bank owners' project choice and the actions of creditors after observing 1 Z . Suppose that at t = 0, the owners financed the bank with debt D. For now, we will take it as given that the debt contract with which financing was raised at t = 0 was one that matures at t = 2 but gives creditors the right to intervene at t = 1 and demand full repayment at that time, forcing either a change in project choice or liquidation if repayment is not forthcoming. We will endogenize this contract when we examine events at t = 0. The actions of the creditors depend on what they believe the bank owners will do at t = 1, conditional on 1 Z , and the owners' actions at t = 0 and t = 1 will depend on what actions they believe the creditors will take in their own best interest at t = 1.
Our interest is in actions that are sub-game perfect for creditors at t = 1, not those that merely represent ex ante efficient but time-inconsistent date-0 threats of intervention. A case of particular interest is that creditors investigate the bank and then decide to let it continue at t = 1, rather than liquidating it. For costly investigation and continuation to be preferred by the creditors, it must be true that: (i) conditional on 1 Z , the creditors know that, without their intervention, the bank owners will choose project B at t = 1, and (ii) the payoff from unconditional liquidation is lower than that from investigation and continuation; recall that creditors cannot distinguish between project G and project A.
Case 1: 1 Z = x . In this case, creditors need to be assured that the bank owners will not prefer project A or project B to project G when is realized (Assumption 5). These incentive compatibility (IC)
conditions are:
In equilibrium, at least one of these two IC constraints must be binding, or else a Pareto superior outcome can be found. Note that (7) is guaranteed by (5), so the constraint (7) is not binding under our maintained assumptions. Thus, (6) must be binding. Solving (6) as an equality yields:
so that if * F F ≤ , the bank owners prefer the efficient project G to the asset-substitution project A.
Case 2: 1 Z = y . To keep the problem interesting, we need to identify conditions such that the manager will prefer project B in the absence of creditor intervention, so creditors will find it sub-game perfect to
intervene. Assumption 5 ensures that this will happen when 0 D is financed entirely with internal equity.
We now state the condition for this when the bank has debt with face value F outstanding. This condition is:
Note that this is guaranteed by (4). Thus, this constraint is also not binding.
Next, we verify that the creditors will indeed wish to intervene and continue with project G rather than liquidate it unconditionally. That is:
where G p F c − is the net expected payoff of the creditors from intervening at a cost c and ensuring choice of project G (expected payoff of G p F for the creditors), and L is the creditors' payoff from liquidation.
Note that if F is sufficiently low so that F L < it is impossible to satisfy (10) and creditors will always unconditionally liquidate. So, assume F is large enough to satisfy
Then we see that satisfying (10) requires:
It is easy to see that 0 F F > , so we just need to make sure that (12) is satisfied.
Moreover, we need to ensure that when creditors intervene and force the bank owners to drop the private-benefit project B, the owners will indeed prefer the efficient project G to the riskier project A.
That is,
This requires:
It is easy to verify that the feasibility condition for debt is met-that is,
From (8) and (14) 
where F is defined in (12) and F  is defined in (14). We also need to verify that F F >  . The restriction that guarantees this is:
It will be assumed for now that (16) holds. We will later examine the consequences of assuming (16) does not hold. Thus, so far we have the following. The intuition is as follows. The bank needs enough debt financing to ensure that creditors, rather than unconditionally liquidating the bank at t = 1, have sufficient "skin in the game" to monitor the bank owners and prevent them from choosing project B at t = 1. If the amount of repayment owed to the creditors is too low, they prefer to take the sure liquidation payoff L at t = 1 without monitoring, rather than to gamble on the risky payoff at t = 2 and also incur the monitoring cost.
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F ≥ This leads to as the condition necessary to prevent managerial rent-seeking. However, there also needs to be sufficient residual value to equity to ensure that, conditional upon the bank owners not opting for B, they will not prefer A over G and therefore not gamble at the expense of bank creditors. This implies that the amount of debt financing can be no greater than F  .
Thus far, we have examined creditors' monitoring incentives, taking as a given that this monitoring will be non-stochastic in states where creditors find it sub-game perfect to monitor. There is, however, a literature on monitoring in costly-state-verification settings, which finds that randomized auditing/monitoring is generally optimal (see, for example, Mookherjee and P'ng (1989) ). We establish below that this result does not apply in our model. The reason why we encounter a different result from the usual one is as follows. In the standard model (e.g., Mookherjee and P'ng (1989) ), randomized auditing is ex-ante efficient because reducing the auditing probability below 1 economizes on expected monitoring costs without adversely affecting the monitored agent's action choice. In our model, however, creditors' monitoring at t = 1 is not intended to provide the bank with the appropriate ex-ante incentives, but rather to make sure that the bank is prevented from choosing the "wrong" project at t = 1. Because the incentive compatibility constraint for creditors to wish to monitor at t = 1 when 1 Z y = must hold pointwise ex post rather than in expectation ex ante (as in mookherjee and P'ng (1989)). Thus, if creditors choose not to monitor when 1 Z y = , they are worse off (under a randomized monitoring scheme) relative to monitoring always.
Events at t = 0
Now we examine the bank's decisions at t = 0 about the intervention rights of creditors, the amount of debt to issue, and the pricing of this debt. We first examine the issue of creditors' intervention rights.
Lemma 2: It is optimal for the bank owners at t = 0 to raise debt with a contract that requires repayment at t = 2 but gives the creditors intervention rights at t = 1 that include the ability to demand full repayment at t = 1 or demand a change in project choice that excludes project B .
The intuition for this result is as follows. Because the bank's project pays off only at t = 2 and the liquidation value of the bank at t = 1 is below its value at t = 2, it is optimal for the bank to have a debt contract that requires repayment at t = 2. However, when 1 Z y = , the bank owners have an incentive to invest in project B, and they would do so if creditors were powerless to stop them. But creditors would also rationally anticipate this action and reflect it in the pricing of the bank's debt at 0 t = , thereby making the bank owners bear the full brunt of investing in the inefficient project B. By giving creditors the intervention rights stipulated in the lemma, the bank owners ensure that project B will not be chosen. Since the expected value of project G or A exceeds that of B, in equilibrium the incremental value gain from not investing in B accrues to the bank owners.
We turn next to the issue of how much debt the bank will issue at t = 0. Note that the amount of debt financing the bank can raise at t = 0 with a debt face value of F is:
We now note a straightforward result. The intuition here is similar to that for Lemma 2. Put simply, since debt is fairly priced and the entire surplus from operating the bank goes to the owners, they wish to have the value of the bank maximized at t = 0. This involves making sure that no surplus cash is left over in the bank to reduce the creditors' risk, given that creditors have based the pricing of debt solely on the project payoff.
Given the costs of raising external debt financing (recall the transaction cost of external financing T even if arbitrarily small), it follows that the debt financing needed to be issued by bank owners to meet the t = 0 need of 0 D is determined after they have used retained earnings or internal liquidity:
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We can now solve for how much debt the bank can issue at t = 0. Since the value of the bank is maximized with the choice of project G, the face value of the debt F must be in the interval ˆ,
Using (17) The intuition is as follows. The bank cannot raise more debt than the level at which assetsubstitution moral hazard is triggered. But interestingly, it cannot raise too little debt either. If the bank has so much equity E that meeting its investment need requires raising less debt than the minimum level D needed to induce the creditors to monitor and prevent choice of the private-benefit project, then some of the equity is paid out as a dividend to ensure that at least D in new debt is raised. Figure 2 depicts this situation of being caught between the threats posed by Scylla and Charybdis, i.e., the tension between needing sufficient debt to impose market discipline on the bank owners and not raising so much debt that the owners will be induced to invest in projects with inefficient risks.
Figure 2 here
Thus far, we have assumed that (16) > and D D <  . Clearly, it is impossible for both these inequalities to hold simultaneously.
The bank will have to choose to forgo either creditor monitoring or the ability to pre-commit to eschew project A, so some inefficiency with private contracting will have to be tolerated.
Which of the two inefficiencies will be tolerated in the second-best outcome will depend on 
IV. CORRELATED DEFAULTS AND EXTERNALITIES
In the analysis up to this point, if (16) holds, then private contracting results in optimal leverage decisions that eliminate the problems created by managerial rent-seeking and risk-shifting and, as a result, eliminate the need for any sort of prudential regulation. If (16) does not hold, then private contracting does not lead to the first-best outcome, as discussed above. This, however, is still the second best that deviates from the first best because not all frictions can be resolved without cost and, again, it is not a prescription for regulatory intervention. We have set up the benchmark model in this way precisely to examine how government forbearance can distort the private outcomes toward socially inefficient ones and how to address this distortion.
We now extend the model by assuming two failure states for the asset-substitution project A: an idiosyncratic state-say, i θ -and a systematic state-say, S θ . The probabilities of these states are i q and s q , respectively, such that 1 i S Ap + =− . Moreover, for simplicity, assume that:
or, in other words, 1 i G q p = − . This condition implies that the probability of idiosyncratic state i θ is the same as the failure probability of the good project G. We assume that in state i θ bank failures are uncorrelated in the cross section of banks and that there are arbitrarily many banks, so that by the law of large numbers, in state i θ , the probability that all banks will fail is zero in the limit. In state S θ , however, these failures are perfectly correlated. Assumptions weaker than (19) would suffice for our purposes, but (19) effectively implies that the entire asset-substitution component of project A relative to project G is due to its systematic risk. Also note that having arbitrarily many banks and i.i.d. project cash flows for project G also guarantees that the probability that all banks will fail together if they choose project G is asymptotically zero. We will consider the case in which (16) holds and also the case in which (16) does not hold.
Rationale for Lender of Last Resort and "Looting" in the End Game
Assume that there is a sufficiently large social cost, Ψ , associated with all banks failing together and their creditors making losses, but no (or a negligibly small) cost associated with the failure of any individual bank.
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Ψ
Then, in the case where all banks fail together, and only in this case, the regulator (such as a LOLR or resolution authority) will find it ex post efficient to intervene and bail out some or all banks. We assume that in a bailout the forbearing regulator needs to pay off only the creditors fully (but can wipe out equity) and thereby avoids the cost . Indeed, if bank owners or shareholders are bailed out too, then the distortions induced by regulatory forbearance would be even larger. Assume also for the sake of argument that all banks are bailed out if they fail together, e.g., due to "fairness" reasons.
Formally, the regulator's objective is to avoid the ex-post social cost Ψ when banks fail together (since this cost is assumed to be sufficiently large) and, among different regulatory policies at t = 0, choose the one that maximizes the ex-ante value of the bank, that is, which leads to efficient project choice at t = 1. The regulator faces the same informational constraints as the bank owners and must respect the contractual features of debt and equity claims that the bank uses (e.g., limited liability of equity, priority of debt over equity, etc.), but it has the ability to restrict the bank's capital structure and its asset choices (only partly, that is, limit investments to storage technology or liquid government bonds, as will be explained below), and potentially create and enforce "super priority" claims on the bank's assets.
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Consider first the case of Proposition 2, where (16) holds and the D that satisfies (18) does not exceed D  . We can then show that with anticipation of regulatory bailouts when banks fail together but not otherwise, there are (at least) two Nash equilibria in the game in which banks are choosing their optimal capital structures. In one Nash equilibrium, all banks continue to raise an amount of debt that is moderate and allows them to meet their date-0 investment need, but it does not trigger asset-substitution
This is a Nash equilibrium because, conditional on all other banks choosing such a D , an individual bank knows that if it deviates and fails, it will not be bailed out since all the other banks will not fail at the same time. Our previous analysis of Proposition 2 stands in this case, and it is privately optimal for each bank to raise ˆ,
But there is also a Nash equilibrium in which all banks asset-substitute in favor of project A (even though condition (18) can be met by a level of debt that would not trigger asset substitution) and raise the maximum possible leverage by setting
we call this the "looting" equilibrium, as in Akerlof and Romer (1993) . To see why, note that if the bank sets the face value of the debt it raises at t = 0 at and creditors believe the bank will choose project A and be bailed out by the central bank or the government in state S θ , then the amount of debt the bank can raise at t = 0 is:
20 An analogy can be made with respect to the objective function of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United States. Its explicit mandate is to provide deposit insurance, charge the insured depositories an ex ante risk-based premium for the insurance, pay off insured claims if the insured institutions fail, resolve (merge or liquidate) the failed institutions, and intervene in an early fashion ("prompt corrective action") with a variety of restrictions on activities in case the capitalization of the insured depository falls below a predetermined level. This means that asset substitution in the presence of forbearance reduces the risk of debt enough and raises debt capacity to the point that banks not only can satisfy their date-0 investment need, but in fact have surplus funds at date 0. We define:
as the "surplus debt" that is raised by the bank at t = 0. This surplus debt can simply be paid out to bank shareholders as a dividend. In essence, the regulator's intervention in state S θ "socializes" the bank's incremental risk in choosing project A relative to project G. This induces all banks to choose project A and also employ excessive leverage. The market discipline that would otherwise be provided by uninsured creditors is lost because creditors are now effectively insured and the relevant agency problem is the conflict of interest between bank owners and taxpayers. That is, the only "economic creditor" of the banking sector is the taxpayer, and the formal creditors are de facto equivalent to bank owners too, at least from a cash flow perspective, though not from a control rights perspective.
Proposition 3 (Looting Equilibrium): Suppose (16) holds and let the minimum debt financing, D, necessary to meet the date-0 investment need satisfies (18). In the extended model with multiple banks and correlated risk in the asset-substitution project
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Equally importantly, note from Proposition 2 that, in the absence of regulatory intervention, when banks are "insolvent" (i.e., the D that satisfies (18) is greater than Hence, maximizing bank equity value can lead to highly-levered capital structures and correlated risky asset choices by bank owners. These capital structure and asset choices "loot" the regulator (effectively the taxpayers) by passing on risks to the regulator as much as possible and paying out dividends from the proceeds of the extra debt issued at t = 0.
The reason why the bank owners insist on the surplus debt issuance S being paid out as a dividend is that it would otherwise stay in the bank and limit creditor shortfalls when the banks fails, reducing the size of the ex-post bailout, and in turn, reducing the ex-ante transfer to bank owners.
D  ), they cannot meet their investment needs at t = 0. However, with correlated asset substitution, the prospect of regulatory intervention enables banks to meet their investment needs and roll over existing debt even in this insolvency region if 22 Acharya, Gujral, Kulkarni, and Shin (2009) show that while distressed depositories (such as Wachovia and Washington Mutual) subject to prompt corrective action by the FDIC cut their dividends a few quarters prior to their failure, similarly distressed investment banks (Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch) in fact raised their dividends in quarters prior to failure even as their leverage was rising. The latter evidence is consistent with anticipation of regulatory forbearance, especially following the rescue of Bear Stearns, providing incentives to the investment banks to not cut back on leverage and dividends even as their insolvency became imminent.
the investment need involves paying off legacy debt. Bank debt now only serves the purpose of curbing managerial rent-seeking, but loses all of its bite as far as pricing the debt to reflect the bank's risk-shifting problem is concerned. In fact, bank leverage is the conduit through which regulatory forbearance is transferred in value terms to bank owners through undertaking of excessively risky projects. Such "looting" arises purely through equity value maximization and it is possible only if risky projects are funded through debt. Recall that shareholders do not get bailed out ex post (as is also typical in practice), so, absent leverage, looting incentives do not exist. Hence, excessively risky projects can be funded through debt-that is, effectively or implicitly government-backed claims-but not through equity.
Somewhat perversely, as project A gets riskier, it increase banks' debt capacity, as shown below:
Corollary 1: Suppose A H increases and A p decreases in such a way that A A p H remains constant and S q adjusts to satisfy (19). Then, absent regulatory intervention to explicitly prevent the bank from taking additional leverage, there is an increase in the amount of debt the bank can issue in the looting equilibrium at t = 0.
Thus, we see that the riskier the asset-substitution project, the worse is the regulator's problem.
Banks can pledge the highest possible cash flow to creditors because their downside in the systematic-risk state is socialized. Therefore, banks' ability to raise debt does not erode because of a mean-preserving increase in the risk of the project being financed. Rather, it perversely expands, highlighting an intuitive-but somewhat surprising-effect of government guarantees in expanding debt capacity of projects by a greater amount as risk increases.
Incentive Compatible Regulatory Policy
How can the regulator design an ex-ante policy to eliminate the high-leverage Nash equilibrium and prevent the choice of the socially-inefficient projects? One way would be to pre-commit not to bail out banks ex post (at least not all the time) when they fail together. However, such a pre-commitment is not time-consistent when the cost of a full-blown crisis is sufficiently high (see footnote 6). Hence, a more attractive approach is to consider ex-ante regulation-for example, a capital requirement.
In fact, if (16) holds, then all that the regulator needs to do is impose a capital requirement that limits the bank's debt to no more than D  . Given that leverage, it becomes privately optimal for the bank to select project G since the incentive compatibility constraint for the choice of G holds. So a simple capital requirement takes care of the problem of looting. Indeed, this reaffirms the well-known role of capital requirements in ameliorating asset-substitution moral hazard. However, this result is predicated on the assumption that (16) eliminates the social cost Ψ . In that sense, this is a feasible regulatory policy. However, with this policy, creditors will have no incentive to monitor the bank and prevent the choice of the private-benefit project, B. This is the very problem that the papers analyzing the market discipline of uninsured demandable debt have articulated (e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) ).
Thus, the feasible capital requirement outlined above can be improved upon if a policy exists that eliminates the social cost Ψ and also ensures selection of the value-maximizing project G.
It turns out that a regulatory policy that attains such an outcome exists: Under the regulatory policy laid out in Proposition 4, the regulator demands that, in addition to the equity input E, which permits the bank to meet its investment need 0 D when combined with new borrowing D , the bank must raise an additional E ∆ in equity. This E ∆ is kept in a "special capital account" and invested in a liquid and riskless security like Treasuries. A key feature of this account is that, while it is available to enhance the bank's shareholders' payoff in the solvency state, it is not available to the bank's creditors in the event of idiosyncratic insolvency.
Proposition 4: In the extended model with multiple banks and correlated risk in the asset-substitution project, assuming that ex post the regulator bails out all banks (creditors take no haircuts but shareholders are wiped out) when they fail together and none otherwise, we obtain the following ex ante (t = 0) optimal regulatory policy: (iv) Suppose (16) holds. Let D be such that it satisfies (18). Then, if
ˆ, D D D   ∈    ,
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The special capital account is in the spirit of cash-asset reserve requirements. However, it goes well beyond reserve requirements, given the restriction on its distribution to creditors. Another key difference is that a reserve requirement simply locks up a fraction of deposits in the form of cash or deposits at the Federal Reserve. By contrast, the special capital account can be "leveraged" by the bank to add assets, just like regular tier-1 capital. That is, with a 4 percent special capital requirement, every dollar of capital in this account allows the bank to put another $25 of assets on its books.
Assuming that the contractual constraint that shareholders cannot be paid anything if creditors are not paid in full is binding, the only resolution is for the capital account to go to the regulator in the event of insolvency. The regulator can, in turn, use the proceeds from the account to fund its administrative costs and potentially even transfer them to surviving banks and firms in the economy (e.g., by lowering taxes).
Another interesting aspect of Proposition 4 is that the special capital account can be arbitrarily large (of course, it is constrained by future cash flows available for backing the issued equity and transaction costs involved in the issuance, which for simplicity we have assumed to be small in all of our algebra). Once F F >  , it does not matter by how much F  exceeds F . The bigger E ∆ is, the higher F  will be, but increases in F  leave F unaffected. This reduces the calibration burden on the regulator, who can choose the minimum level of the special capital account to be quite large without worrying about diluting the monitoring incentives of creditors. Note that the original equity E is viewed here as part of the "normal" (or tier 1) capital.
What does it mean for the creditors to not have access to the special capital account in the event of bankruptcy when we admit the possibility of a bailout by the regulator? If all banks fail together (by choosing and experiencing the correlated-default state), then the regulator bails them all out and creditors take no haircut, making the treatment of the special capital account a moot point in this state. In other words, it does effectively pay off the creditors. However, if a particular bank experiences idiosyncratic failure when some others succeed, its special capital account goes to the regulator rather than its creditors.
This means that creditors take some haircut even if there is capital in the special account. Since credit remains risky, monitoring incentives are preserved.
Thus, it is the combination of what happens in the project-success state (the special capital account is an additional equity input that belongs to the bank's shareholders) and the non-systemic failure state (the special capital account belongs to the regulator rather than the creditors) that allows assetsubstitution moral hazard to be deterred without diluting creditors' monitoring incentives.
Formally, why this works is as follows. When (16) is violated, F F >  . So F F = must be chosen to ensure that creditors will monitor the bank. Because this violates the IC constraint for the bank to prefer project G to A, we need to increase F  without affecting F such that F F >  and (16) is honored once again. Providing an additional equity input-via the special capital account-helps raise F  since this amount is invested in the riskless asset. This action increases the bank shareholders' payoff in the solvency state and thus reduces asset-substitution moral hazard. But it does not affect F since it is not available to bank creditors in the event of insolvency; note that creditors do not care about this account in the solvency state since they get paid in full with or without this account. Consequently, the special capital account is "invisible" to the creditors. Once F  is raised sufficiently, it will eventually exceed F and (16) will hold. All of our previous results (Section III, Proposition 1) will therefore apply.
Another point to note is that the proposition claims that when (16) does not hold, the proposed scheme is one, but not the only, efficient scheme. This is because all that is required is that the special capital account be invested in something within the bank, not siphoned off by the bank owners.
Mandating investment in Treasury securities is one way to achieve this, but clearly any permissible investment will do. We will discuss in the next section the conditions under which mandating investment of the special capital account in Treasury securities becomes the unique efficient equilibrium.
We have assumed thus far that cash flow non-verifiability means that all external finance must be in the form of debt. So where would an additional equity input, if necessary, come from? Here our assumption is that the bank owners would be asked to provide the additional equity. Our analysis does not deal with the private costs the owners would incur/perceive in raising this equity, but the issue of the magnitude of these costs is somewhat debatable and worthy of further consideration.
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One may argue that introducing the special capital account means that we have given the regulator contracting possibilities that were unavailable to the bank and its financiers in the absence of the regulator. In particular, this account represents a kind of security that differs from debt and equity. This security achieves efficiency by breaking the "budget-balancing constraint" requiring that the sum of the claims of the shareholders and bondholders must be equal to the total claims on the bank.
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24 Bank owners may possess assets other than the bank, and these may be such that equity claims can be issued against them. Alternatively, bank owners may have liquid wealth that could be used to provide an additional equity input to the bank, but this may impose non-diversification costs on bank owners. These costs are absent in our model because all parties are risk neutral.
The reason why such a security was not permitted in the absence of the regulator is that we limited the set of securities available for contracting to debt and equity and did not address the problem of optimal mechanism/security design in the presence of a third party (such as the regulator) that is not a claimant of the firm. 26 We do not know of any existing securities that correspond exactly to the special capital account.
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We believe, however, that the regulator has the tools to do better on this front than is possible with private contracting. The reason is that if private contracting were to involve a security similar to the special capital account, it would require payment to a third party (not the bank, or its debt and equity financiers) in the event of an idiosyncratic failure, which would make it necessary for a court to verify whether a failure was idiosyncratic or systemic. This action may be more costly or difficult for the court than for a bank regulator, especially when banks may have failed and expediency may be a practical necessity. Thus, private contracting would de facto give the bank's shareholders the expected value of the ex post state-contingent transfer, which may undermine their ex ante incentives to avoid the risky project
A. Yet another issue is that it is important for the scheme described in Proposition 4 that there be no counterparty risk, i.e., no doubt about the ability of the insurer to bail out all banks. Thus, capital requirements would be necessary on a new set of agents -the private insurers.. In essence, there would need to be a regulator of the private insurer with problems similar to those we have analyzed for banks But if such a security were to be designed, then the inefficiency associated with the second best (when (16) does not hold) may be eliminated, and the regulator may be able to rely on this security instead of the special capital account.
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Finally, we have assumed that when banks fail en masse, the regulator bails out all the banks. If the regulator were to bail out only a subset of banks-say, only the largest banks in the spirit of .
26
Numerous papers have provided the micro-foundations of debt and equity as optimal securities. See, among others, Boot and Thakor (1993) . 27 The special capital account also differs from a deposit insurance premium. First, creditors are not guaranteed in all instances of bank failures, but only in case of systemic failures. Thus, the regulator imposes a "haircut" on creditors in case of such failures, whereas with deposit insurance, insured creditors are paid off regardless of whether bank failures are idiosyncratic or systemic. And second, contributions to the special capital account belong to bank shareholders in success states, and are therefore not like once-and-for-all payments to the deposit insurance fund. That is, the capital-account contributions are more like a "deductible" than a "premium." 28 See Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) , and Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010a) .
TBTF-or the systemically most important banks, then the looting problem we have discussed will be confined to that subset, as will be the application of the capital-requirement regime in Proposition 4.
V. INEFFICIENT PERQUISITES CONSUMPTION
In the model so far, we have considered two forms of moral hazard: managerial private benefits and assetsubstitution. However, in practice, there may be a third from of moral hazard: inefficient consumption of perquisites or diversion of cash flows by bank managers. We sidestepped this issue in our formal analysis by assuming that the bank was run by its owners. However, even in this case, when there is a special capital account, there may be incentives for the owners to inefficiently consume perquisites out of excess cash,
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Once this possibility is recognized, it becomes uniquely efficient for the regulator to mandate investment of the special capital account in Treasury securities, if we assume that any other kind of investment could be perquisites consumption in disguise.
since the cost of this consumption is shared with the regulator who takes possession of this account in the event of an idiosyncratic failure. Thus, we see that adding this third form of moral hazard makes it necessary for the regulator to control how the special capital account is invested. In particular, the regulator needs to ensure that the bank owners do not merely take money from one pocket and inefficiently transfer it to another when they provide funds for the special capital account.
VI. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
29 By excess cash, we mean that the bank has raised via security issuance more cash than it needs to roll over its legacy debt. This issue of excess cash is relevant because the bank has an incentive to issue more debt than needed to meet its investment need when there is a lender of last resort. 30 For example, a subsidized loan could be made to a company to build a fancy office at a below-market rate or provide a corporate jet at a below-market price.
Our analysis has several implications for regulatory capital requirements. We discuss below the implementation of the two-tiered capital requirement in Proposition 4 (when (16) does not hold).
Suppose that banks are at their "regular" tier-1 capital requirement at the outset. The regulator could ask each bank to retain all earnings and not pay any dividends, have the bank put the retained earnings in a "special" capital account, and require a separate minimum capital ratio for this kind of capital. 31 Once the special capital ratio exceeds that particular level, the bank can resume dividend payments. The retained earnings can be invested only in predetermined securities such as Treasuries.
When a negative shock hits (either bank-specific or systemic) and the bank's tier-1 capital diminishes, it would be allowed to sell these securities and transfer cash from the special capital account to the regular capital account; indeed, this would be a requirement if banks do not replenish tier-1 capital through other means, such as equity issuances. However, the dividends would be frozen until special capital is built back up to its required ratio
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Note that this approach can deal not only with the challenge of refurbishing capital but also with potential liquidity shortages, since selling Treasuries provides liquidity. This proposal to preserve capital-or, in other words, to prevent capital erosion-has numerous advantages.
. First, the two-tiered capital proposal deals simultaneously with the various forms of moral hazard most commonly studied in banking-managerial rent-seeking, managerial perquisites consumption, and shareholders' risk-shifting-in an integrated way and incorporates both the market discipline of debt as well as the risk-attenuation benefit of equity. For instance, the proposal gets around the criticism that more capital makes bank managers lazy or reduces creditor-induced market discipline. This is because the special capital account is additional capital that would not exist otherwise (money would have been paid out as dividends)-so it does not replace the debt that provides discipline. Moreover, the bank cannot invest the retentions as it pleases-the investments have to be in Treasury securities.
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The idea of building up equity via divided retentions invokes dynamic contracting issues. A dynamic agency model of financial contracting appears in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and is beyond the scope of our paper. 32 Using dividends to build up equity also avoids dissipative adverse-selection selection costs of issuing new equity. Banks will not choose to impose such dividend restrictions on their own because the associated benefit of avoiding the systemic externality of en masse bank failures is not a private benefit to any bank.
Second, the proposal has the advantage of not requiring shareholders to infuse additional cash capital at a time when confidence in bank management is at its nadir and liquidity is very low. Dividends can be retained at a time when the bank is doing well, or at least not in imminent danger of distress.
Third, the high capital during normal times also leads to a reduction of asset substitution during such times. The fact that the shareholders/managers will lose this special capital in a bad state means the positive aspect of high capital is maintained. Thus, we avoid the gradual pre-crisis erosion of bank capital during the good times (through dividend and cash distributions to shareholders and bank managers) that can convert an adverse asset-side shock into a crisis. More importantly, our scheme eliminates bank behavior that makes adverse asset shocks endogenously more likely owing to correlated choices of poor investments with other banks.
Fourth, the idea of building and preserving capital through retained earnings and dividend restrictions is relatively simple. In particular, since capital is transferred from the special capital account into the regular capital account on a continuous and mechanical basis, the issue of designing "crisis triggers" does not arise. The bank's regular capital never gets depleted (absent unexpected shocks), nor is the bank required to raise additional equity by issuing stock.
Fifth, no adverse information is communicated by dividend restrictions kicking in when capital has to be moved from the special capital account into the regular capital account because a negative shock to earnings has depleted the regular capital account. This is because the "automatic" nature of the transfer involves no management/regulatory discretion and hence communicates no information beyond that already contained in the negative earnings shock.
Sixth, if this scheme is limited to only the systemically important banks, then the special capital account could be viewed as a "special surcharge" on those banks.
Finally, the scheme is relatively easy to harmonize internationally, or at least as easy as the current tier-1 capital requirements.
In the fall of 2009, regulators raised the issue of banks needing to have additional liquid capital in difficult financial times and recommended the idea of "capital conservation." Later in the year, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) proposed "a framework to promote the conservation of capital and the build-up of adequate buffers above the minimum that can be drawn down in periods of distress." The BIS Task Force also questioned the prudence of the continuation of dividend payments by banks in 2008-09, a period when they were supposed to cut dividends (see Acharya, Gujral, Kulkarni, and Shin (2009) ). The model presented here generates a formal rationale for the BIS capital conservation proposal, and also provides a channel through which dividend restrictions can be used to gradually replenish bank capital levels and dissolve risk-shifting incentives without diminishing the market discipline of subordinated debt. Since dividend cuts are mechanically triggered when banks access their special capital account, dividend payments cannot resume unless the special capital account is replenished to meet the regulatory requirement (e.g., some percentage of assets).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a theoretical model to examine the tension between the role of leverage in disciplining bank managers-preventing rent-seeking that takes the form of perks or the choice of inefficient "pet" projects-and the role of bank capital in diminishing the risk-shifting incentives of bank shareholders. These agency problems are at least as old as the research by Jensen and Meckling (1976) .
Recently, however, Hellwig (2009) has pointed out the "asymmetry" in Jensen and Meckling's modeling of the agency costs of debt (asset substitution) and equity (managerial pursuit of private benefits), explaining that, in typical models, managerial pursuit of private benefits does not alter project risk, whereas asset substitution does. This asymmetry prevents an analysis of optimal capital structure along a common continuum of project choices.
Our paper addresses exactly this issue in the context of bank leverage choices.
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The calibration issue of what this percentage should be is outside the scope of our model. By all accounts, however, current Basel risk weights might need to be revisited to take account of systematic or correlated risk of assets rather than their total or absolute risk. See Acharya (2009 ), and Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010a , 2010b .
We show that the tension between private-benefits and asset-substitution moral hazard problems requires that bank 34 For other papers that combine the rent-seeking and risk-shifting moral hazard problems, see Biais and Casamatta (1999) , and Edmans and Liu (2010) . In particular, Biais and Casamatta also argue that effort investment requires leverage not be too low or too high. The key to the result that leverage not be too low is the need to create strong enough incentives for creditors to monitor and deter managerial rent-seeking. And the key to the result that leverage not be too high is based on the need to have enough capital in the bank to eliminate the shareholders' propensity to take excessive risk at the creditors' expense. This leads to a theory of optimal bank capital structure with private contracting.
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When we introduce correlated default risk, bank failures generate negative social externalities.
This result creates a potential case for ex post regulatory intervention to bail out banks when they fail en masse. Such discretionary regulatory forbearance itself becomes a source of systemic risk. It leads to multiple Nash equilibria for ex ante bank capital structures, one of which involves banks over-levering themselves, selecting socially inefficient, excessively risky and cross sectionally correlated projects, and paying out surplus debt as dividends or other forms of cash distributions. Indeed, riskier projects may be funded only with debt and not equity, as it is the creditors that enjoy the ex post forbearance.
By funding risky projects, however, bank owners effectively extract rents from regulators and taxpayers. Under some conditions, a simple minimum equity capital requirement solves the problem and eliminates the bad Nash equilibrium. But in general, this approach can make bank debt too safe and erode market discipline, necessitating an additional tier of capital requirements-a special capital account-that involves restrictions on dividend payments and on how the special capital may be invested in good times.
That is, it prevents creditors from accessing it in the event of bank failures. Such capital regulation prevents erosion of capital in good times, avoids costly issuance of capital in bad times, and yet preserves the market discipline of debt.
more leverage ,whereas risk-shifting containment requires less leverage. These papers do not, however, consider the correlated risk-taking across banks and the related regulatory distortions that we analyze in this paper. 35 Mehran and Thakor (forthcoming) provide a theory of bank capital structure that focuses on the monitoring benefits of bank capital and predicts that higher capital is correlated with higher bank values in the cross section. They also provide empirical evidence to support this view. By contrast, our theory here focuses on the role of bank capital in dealing with three forms of moral hazard and optimal capital-replenishment regulatory policy.
FIGURE 1: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
• Bank owners determine how much new debt to raise to fund the investment need (or roll over legacy debt) of 0 D
• Let F be the date-2 face value promised to debt issued.
• A signal, 1 Z , of the terminal project cash flow, 2 Z , is realized.
• After observing 1 Z , bank owners choose one out of a set of mutually-exclusive projects: to asset-substitution project A, private-benefit project B, and the good project G.
• Creditors then decide whether to monitor or intervene and can force a change in project choice, based upon 1 Z .
• Creditors may also choose to liquidate the bank after observing 1 Z .
• (12) ensures that creditors will wish to monitor, intervene, and continue with project G. Since the bank owners can change project choice at t = 1, any case in which the creditors choose not to monitor will lead to the bank owners choosing project B if 1 Z y = . But given that (12) holds, it is never sub-game perfect for creditors to not monitor when 1 Z y = , so they monitor with probability 1. When 1 Z x = , creditors know that the bank owners prefer project G, so it is not optimal for them to incur the monitoring cost c. ∎
Proof of Lemma 2:
Since the external providers of capital simply earn their reservation return of zero, all remaining surplus goes to the initial owners of the bank, and this surplus is maximized by choosing project G.
However, ensuring the choice of G depends on the creditors having intervention rights at t = 1 that give them the ability to either liquidate the bank or demand full repayment at t = 1. Without this, the bank owners would select project B, which then reduces their surplus ex ante at t = 0. Designing a debt contract with repayment at t = 2 is efficient because the project cash flow is realized at t = 2. ∎
Proof of Lemma 3:
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. To maximize the bank's ex ante surplus for the owners, project G must be chosen. This means that the amount of debt must have face value ˆ, F F F   ∈    to ensure there is incentive compatibility (IC). Funds raised in excess of that needed to roll over legacy debt can be paid out to the owners without violating the IC constraint. , thereby satisfying (12). Note that (12) treats the project success probability as G p , so the assumption is that if banks select project A, the regulator will bail out all banks if they fail together and none otherwise (which makes the probability of success from the creditors' standpoint exactly equal to G p ). By assumption, the F  that satisfies (14) . Once this is achieved, both the IC constraints will be satisfied and project G will be chosen. To the extent that issuing equity is prohibitively expensive, allowing the bank to raise E ∆ through earnings retentions will be value maximizing. Thus, as long as G b p > (the perquisites consumption is not too inefficient), the owners will prefer to consume E ∆ as perquisites by dressing up the perquisites consumption as a real project. ∎
